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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms-09" submissionType="IETF" category="std" xml:lang="en" indexInclude="true" consensus="true" tocDepth="4">

<front>
<title abbrev="json-proof-algorithms">JSON Proof Algorithms</title><seriesInfo value="draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms-09" stream="IETF" status="standard" name="Internet-Draft"/>
<author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones"><organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization><address><postal><street/>
</postal><email>michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</email>
<uri>https://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address></author><author initials="D." surname="Waite" fullname="David Waite"><organization>Ping Identity</organization><address><postal><street/>
</postal><email>dwaite+jwp@pingidentity.com</email>
</address></author><author initials="J." surname="Miller" fullname="Jeremie Miller"><organization>Ping Identity</organization><address><postal><street/>
</postal><email>jmiller@pingidentity.com</email>
</address></author><date/>
<area>Internet</area>
<workgroup>jose</workgroup>
<keyword>json</keyword>
<keyword>jose</keyword>
<keyword>zkp</keyword>
<keyword>jwp</keyword>
<keyword>jws</keyword>
<keyword>jpa</keyword>
<keyword>cbor</keyword>
<keyword>cose</keyword>

<abstract>
<t>The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web Key (JWK), and COSE specifications. It defines IANA registries for these identifiers.</t>
</abstract>

</front>

<middle>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>
<t>The JSON Web Proof (JWP) <xref target="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof"/> draft establishes a new secure container format that supports selective disclosure and unlinkability using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or other cryptographic algorithms.</t>
<blockquote><t>Editor's Note: This draft is still early and incomplete. There will be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here.  Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything except personal experimentation and learning.  Contributions and feedback are welcomed at <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof">https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof</eref>.</t>
</blockquote></section>

<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
<t>The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier" are used as defined by the VC Data Model <xref target="VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0"/>.  The term "presentation" is also used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in this specification to minimize confusion with other definitions.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>
<t>The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Signature", and "JWS Protected Header" are defined by <xref target="RFC7515"/>.</t>
<t>The terms "JSON Web Proof (JWP)", "JWP Payload", "JWP Proof", and "JWP Protected Header" are defined by <xref target="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof"/>.</t>
<t>These terms are defined by this specification:</t>

<dl spacing="compact">
<dt>Stable Key:</dt>
<dd>An asymmetric key-pair used by an issuer that is also shared via an out-of-band mechanism to a verifier to validate the signature.</dd>
<dt>Ephemeral Key:</dt>
<dd>An asymmetric key-pair that is generated for one-time use by an issuer and never stored or used again outside of the creation of a single JWP.</dd>
<dt>Presentation Key:</dt>
<dd>An asymmetric key-pair that is generated by a holder and used to ensure that a presentation is not able to be replayed by any other party.</dd>
</dl>
</section>

<section anchor="background"><name>Background</name>
<t>JWP defines a container binding together a protected header, one or more payloads, and a cryptographic proof.  It does not define any details about the interactions between an application and the cryptographic libraries that implement proof-supporting algorithms.</t>
<t>Due to the nature of ZKPs, this specification also documents the subtle but important differences in proof algorithms versus those defined by the JSON Web Algorithms <xref target="RFC7518"/>.  These differences help support more advanced capabilities such as blinded signatures and predicate proofs.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="algorithm-basics"><name>Algorithm Basics</name>
<t>The four principal interactions that every proof algorithm MUST support are <tt>[issue](#issue)</tt>, <tt>[confirm](#confirm)</tt>, <tt>[present](#present)</tt>, and <tt>[verify](#verify)</tt>.</t>

<section anchor="issue"><name>Issue</name>
<t>The JWP is first created as the output of a JPA's <tt>issue</tt> operation.</t>
<t>Every algorithm MUST support a JSON issuer protected header along with one or more octet string payloads.  The algorithm MAY support using additional items provided by the holder for issuance such as blinded payloads, keys for replay prevention, etc.</t>
<t>All algorithms MUST provide integrity protection for the issuer header and all payloads and MUST specify all digest and/or hash2curve methods used.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="confirm"><name>Confirm</name>
<t>Performed by the holder to validate that the issued JWP is correctly formed and protected.</t>
<t>Each algorithm MAY support using additional input items options, such as those sent to the issuer for issuance. After confirmation, an algorithm MAY return a modified JWP for serialized storage without the local state (such as with blinded payloads now unblinded).</t>
<t>The algorithm MUST fully verify the issued proof value against the issuer protected header and all payloads.  If given a presented JWP instead of an issued one, the confirm process MUST return an error.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="present"><name>Present</name>
<t>Used to apply any selective disclosure choices and perform any unlinkability transformations, as well as to show binding.</t>
<t>An algorithm MAY support additional input options from the requesting party, such as for predicate proofs and verifiable computation requests.</t>
<t>Every algorithm MUST support the ability to hide any or all payloads.  It MUST always include the issuer protected header unmodified in the presentation.</t>
<t>The algorithm MUST replace the issued proof value and generate a new presented proof value.  It also MUST include a new presentation protected header that provides replay protection.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="verify"><name>Verify</name>
<t>Performed by the verifier to verify the protected headers along with any disclosed payloads and/or assertions about them from the proving party, while also verifying they are the same payloads and ordering as witnessed by the issuer.</t>
<t>The algorithm MUST verify the integrity of all disclosed payloads and MUST also verify the integrity of both the issuer and presentation protected headers.</t>
<t>If the presented proof contains any assertions about the hidden payloads, the algorithm MUST also verify all of those assertions.
It MAY support additional options, such as those sent to the holder to generate the presentation.</t>
<t>If given an issued JWP for verification, the algorithm MUST return an error.</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="algorithm-specifications"><name>Algorithm Specifications</name>
<t>This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWPs.</t>

<section anchor="single-use"><name>Single Use</name>
<t>The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional asymmetric signatures into a single JWP proof.  It enables a very simple form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced cryptographic techniques.</t>
<t>It does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWPs (dynamically or in batches).</t>

<section anchor="jws-algorithm"><name>JWS Algorithm</name>
<t>The Single Use algorithm is based on using multiple signatures to cover the individual payloads, all of which are generated with the same Asymmetric JSON Web Algorithm (JWA).  The internal signing algorithm to use is part of the registration for a new Single Use algorithm identifier.</t>
<t>The chosen JWA MUST be an asymmetric signing algorithm so that each signature can be verified without sharing any private values between the parties.  This ensures that the verifier cannot brute force any non-disclosed payloads based only on their disclosed individual signatures.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="holder-setup"><name>Holder Setup</name>
<t>In order to support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a verifier, the holder MUST use a Presentation Key during the issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP.  This Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP.</t>
<t>The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key.  The holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as unique.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-setup"><name>Issuer Setup</name>
<t>To create a Single Use JWP, the issuer first generates a unique Ephemeral Key using the selected internal algorithm.  This key-pair will be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="signing-payloads"><name>Signing payloads</name>
<t>Each individual payload is signed using the selected internal algorithm using the Ephemeral Key.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-protected-header"><name>Issuer Protected Header</name>
<t>The issuer's Ephemeral Key MUST be included in the issuer protected header via the Proof Key header parameter.</t>
<t>The holder's Presentation Key MUST be included in issuer protected header via the Presentation Key header parameter.</t>
<t>The issuer protected header is signed using the given JWA and the issuer's Stable Key.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="payloads"><name>Payloads</name>
<t>Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed using the given JWA using the issuer's Ephemeral Key.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="proof"><name>Proof</name>
<t>The proof value is an octet string array. The first entry is the octet string of the issuer protected header signature, with an additional entry for each payload signature.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-protected-header"><name>Presentation Protected Header</name>
<t>To generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a presentation protected header that is specific to the verifier being presented to.  This header MUST contain a parameter that both the holder and verifier trust as being unique and non-replayable.
Use of the <tt>nonce</tt> header parameter is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.</t>
<t>This specification registers the <tt>nonce</tt> header parameter for the presentation protected header that contains a string value either generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the verifier.  When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value matches during verification.</t>
<t>The presentation protected header MAY contain other header parameters that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder.  These presentation header parameters SHOULD NOT contain values that are common across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single presentation and verifier.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation"><name>Presentation</name>
<blockquote><t>Editor's Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder's signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.</t>
</blockquote><t>The holder derives a new proof as part of presentation.  The presented proof value will always contain the issuer's Stable Key signature for the issuer protected header as the first element.</t>
<t>The second element of the presented proof is the holder's signature of the presentation protected header using the holder's presentation key. This signature is constructed using the same algorithm described in generating the issuer's signature over the issuer protected header. Signing only the presentation header with the Presentation Key is sufficient to protect the entire presentation since that key is private to the holder and only the contents of the presentation header are used for replay prevention.</t>
<t>For each payload which is to be disclosed, the corresponding payload signature (from the issued JWP) is included in the proof. If a payload is omitted from the presented JWP, the signature value will NOT be includeed, and the presentation proof will have one less part.</t>
<t>For example, if the second and fifth of five payloads are not disclosed, then the holder's derived proof would consist of the issuer's signature over the issuer protected header, the holder's signature over the holder's protected header, the ephemeral key signature over the first, third and fourth payloads.</t>
<t>Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and remain unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP SHOULD only be presented a single time to each verifier in order for the holder to remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="verification"><name>Verification</name>
<t>The verifier MUST verify the issuer protected header octets against the first part in the proof using the issuer's Stable Key. It MUST also verify the presentation protected header octets against the second part in the proof value using the holder's Presentation Key, as provided in the Presentation Key header parameter.</t>
<t>With the headers verified, the Proof Key header parameter can then be used to verify each of the disclosed payload signatures.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="SU-registration"><name>JPA Registration</name>
<t>The proposed JWP <tt>alg</tt> value is of the format "SU-" appended with the relevant JWS <tt>alg</tt> value for the chosen public and ephemeral key-pair algorithm, for example "SU-ES256".</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="bbs"><name>BBS</name>
<t>The BBS Signature Scheme <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures"/> is under active development within the CRFG.</t>
<t>This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and unlinkability, enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued JWP without a verifier being able to correlate those presentations together based on the proof.</t>

<section anchor="BBS-registration"><name>JPA Algorithms</name>
<t>The <tt>BBS</tt> algorithm corresponds to a ciphersuite identifier of <tt>BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_</tt>.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="key-format"><name>Key Format</name>
<t>The key used for the <tt>BBS</tt> algorithm is an elliptic curve-based key pair, specifically against the G_2 subgroup of a pairing friendly curve. Additional details on key generation can be found in <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="bare" section="Section 3.4"/>. The JWK and Cose Key Object representations of the key are detailed in <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations"/>.</t>
<t>There is no additional holder presentation key necessary for presentation proofs.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuance"><name>Issuance</name>
<t>Issuance is performed using the <tt>Sign</tt> operation from <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.1"/>. This operation utilizes the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 key pair as <tt>SK</tt> and <tt>PK</tt>, along with desired protected header and payloads as the octets <tt>header</tt> and the octets array <tt>messages</tt>.</t>
<t>The octets resulting from this operation form a single octet string in the issuance proof array, to be used along with the protected header and payloads to serialize the JWP.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuance-proof-verification"><name>Issuance Proof Verification</name>
<t>Holder verification of the signature on issuance form is performed using the <tt>Verify</tt> operation from <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.2"/>.</t>
<t>This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as <tt>PK</tt>, the proof as <tt>signature</tt>, the protected header octets as <tt>header</tt> and the array of payload octets as <tt>messages</tt>.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-1"><name>Presentation</name>
<t>Derivation of a presentation is done by the holder using the <tt>ProofGen</tt> operation from <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.3"/>.</t>
<t>This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as <tt>PK</tt>, the issuer protected header as <tt>header</tt>, the issuance proof as <tt>signature</tt>, the issuance payloads as <tt>messages</tt>, and the holder's presentation protected header as <tt>ph</tt>.</t>
<t>The operation also takes a vector of indexes into <tt>messages</tt>, describing which payloads the holder wishes to disclose. All payloads are required for proof generation, but only these indicated payloads will be required to be disclosed for later proof verification.</t>
<t>The output of this operation is the presentation proof, as a single octet string.</t>
<t>Presentation serialization leverages the two protected headers and presentation proof, along with the disclosed payloads. Non-disclosed payloads are represented with the absent value of <tt>null</tt> in CBOR serialization and a zero-length string in compact serialization.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-verification"><name>Presentation Verification</name>
<t>Verification of a presentation is done by the verifier using the <tt>ProofVerify</tt> operation from <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="bare" section="Section 3.5.4"/>.</t>
<t>This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as <tt>PK</tt>, the issuer protected header as <tt>header</tt>, the issuance proof as <tt>signature</tt>, the holder's presentation protected header as <tt>ph</tt>, and the payloads as <tt>disclosed_messages</tt>.</t>
<t>In addition, the <tt>disclosed_indexes</tt> scalar array is calculated from the payloads provided. Values disclosed in the presented payloads have a zero-based index in this array, while the indices of absent payloads are omitted.</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="message-authentication-code"><name>Message Authentication Code</name>
<t>The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate ephemeral keys and compute authentication codes to protect the issuer header and each payload individually.</t>
<t>Like the the Single Use algorithm family, it also does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times. and requires an individually issued JWP for each presentation in order to fully protect privacy.  When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC requires less computation but can result in potentially larger presentation proof values.</t>
<t>The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom hash-based construct.  It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC method such as HMAC <xref target="RFC2104"/> or <eref target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf">KMAC</eref>.  It uses traditional public-key based signatures to verify the authenticity of the issuer and holder.</t>

<section anchor="holder-setup-1"><name>Holder Setup</name>
<t>Prior to the issuer creating a new JWP, the issuer MUST have a presentation public key provided by the holder.</t>
<t>The holder's presentation key MUST be included in the issuer's protected header using the Presentation Key header parameter.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-setup-1"><name>Issuer Setup</name>
<t>To use the MAC algorithm, the issuer must have a stable public key pair to perform signing.  To start the issuance process, a single 32-byte random Shared Secret must first be generated.  This value will be shared privately to the holder as part of the issuer's JWP proof value.</t>
<t>The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC method's key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys.  These keys are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="combined-mac-representation"><name>Combined MAC Representation</name>
<t>The combined MAC representation is a single octet string representing the MAC values of the issuer protected header, along with each payload provided by the issuer. This representation is signed by the issuer, but not shared - parties will recreate this octet string and verify the signature to verify the integrity of supplied issuer protected header and the integrity of any disclosed payloads.</t>
<t>The issuer protected header is included in this value as a MAC created using the fixed key "issuer_header" in UTF-8 encoded octets. The value is the issuer header JSON as a UTF-8 encoded octet string.</t>
<t>A unique key is generated for each payload using a MAC, with the Shared Secret as the key and a value of "payload_X" as UTF-8 encoded octets, where "X" is replaced by the zero-based array index of the payload, for example "payload_0", "payload_1", etc.</t>
<t>Each payload then itself has a corresponding MAC, using the above per-payload key and the payload octet string.</t>
<t>The combined MAC representation is the octet string formed by the the concatentation of the issuer protected header MAC output, along with each payload MAC output.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-proof"><name>Issuer Proof</name>
<t>The issuer proof consists of two octet strings.</t>
<t>The first octet string is the issuer signature over the combined MAC representation. The issuer signs the JWS using its stable public key, and a fixed header containing the <tt>alg</tt> associated with signing algorithm in use.</t>
<t><tt>jws_header = '{"alg":"ES256"}'</tt></t>
<t>The signature value of the JWS is extracted and base64url-decoded into an octet string.</t>
<t>The second octet string is the Shared Secret used to generate the per-payload keys for the combined representation.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-protected-header-1"><name>Presentation Protected Header</name>
<t>See the JWS <eref target="#presentation-protected-header">Presentation Protected Header</eref> section.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-proof"><name>Presentation Proof</name>
<blockquote><t>Editor's Note: The current definition here is incomplete, the holder's signature needs to also incorporate the presented proof.</t>
</blockquote><t>The first value in the presentation proof is the presentation signature. This is a signature over the presentation protected header, using the key specified by the Presentation Key header parameter in the issuer protected header.</t>
<t>The second value is the issuer signature over the Combined MAC Representation provided with the issued form.</t>
<t>The remaining values are used by the verifier to reconstruct the combined MAC representation without access to the Shared Secret. There is one value corresponding to each payload, whether it has been disclosed or not.</t>
<t>If a payload is disclosed, the unique per-payload key derived from the shared secret is used as the payload's entry in the proof array.</t>
<t>If a payload is not disclosed, the payload's MAC in the combined MAC representation is used as the payload's entry in the proof array.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="verification-of-the-presentation-proof"><name>Verification of the Presentation Proof</name>
<t>The verifier must recreate the Combined MAC Representation from the presentation proof to verify integrity over the disclosed information.</t>
<t>The issuer protected header MAC is recreated using the same mechanism described above.</t>
<t>For each payload in the presentation:</t>

<ul>
<li><t>If the payload is disclosed, then the presentation proof contains the unique per-payload key. The corresponding payload MAC can be computed by performing the MAC operation with this key and the corresponding payload.</t>
</li>
<li><t>If the payload is not disclosed, then the presentation proof contains the payload MAC, which can be used directly</t>
</li>
</ul>
<t>The concatenation of the octets of the issuer protected header MAC and each payload MAC forms the Combined MAC Representation. The issuer signature in the proof is then verified by converting these values to a JWS as described above, and verifying that JWS.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="MAC-registration"><name>JPA Registration</name>
<t>Proposed JWP <tt>alg</tt> value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used.  Below are the initial registrations:</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li><tt>MAC-H256</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-256</tt> as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H384</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-384</tt> as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H512</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-512</tt> as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-K25519</tt> uses <tt>KMAC SHAKE128</tt> as the MAC and <tt>EdDSA using Curve25519</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-K448</tt> uses <tt>KMAC SHAKE256</tt> as the MAC and <tt>EdDSA using Curve448</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H256K</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-256</tt> as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256</tt> for the signatures</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>
<blockquote><t>Editor's Note: This will follow once the algorithms defined here have become more stable.</t>
</blockquote>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Data minimization of the proof value</li>
<li>Unlinkability of the protected header contents</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>The following registration procedure is used for all the
registries established by this specification.</t>
<t>Values are registered on a Specification Required <xref target="RFC5226"/> basis
after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published.</t>
<t>Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP algorithm: example").</t>
<t>Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny
the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA.
Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable,
suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.</t>
<t>Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality,
whether it is likely to be of general applicability
or useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration description is clear.</t>
<t>IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct
all requests for registration to the review mailing list.</t>
<t>It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to
represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification,
in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions.
In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as
creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert,
that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.</t>

<section anchor="AlgsReg"><name>JSON Web Proof Algorithms Registry</name>
<t>This specification establishes the
IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry
for values of the JWP <tt>alg</tt> (algorithm) parameter in JWP Header Parameters.
The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm description,
the algorithm usage locations,
the implementation requirements, the change controller,
and a reference to the specification that defines it.
The same algorithm name can be registered multiple times,
provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint.</t>
<t>It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm
name when multiple variations of algorithms are being
registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for
each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by
key derivation functions).
This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make security decisions.</t>
<t>The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence
that algorithms being registered either are currently considered
cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated
or Prohibited.</t>
<t>The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed
over time as the
cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance,
to change the status of an algorithm to Deprecated or
to change the status of an algorithm from Optional
to Recommended+ or Required.
Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted
on a Specification Required basis after review by the Designated Experts,
with the new specification
defining the revised implementation requirements level.</t>

<section anchor="AlgsTemplate"><name>Registration Template</name>

<dl spacing="compact">
<dt>Algorithm Name:</dt>
<dd>Brief descriptive name of the algorithm
(e.g., <tt>Single-Use JWP using ES256</tt>.)
Descriptive names may not match other registered names unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm JSON Label:</dt>
<dd>The string label requested (e.g., <tt>SU-ES256</tt>). This label is a
case-sensitive ASCII string. JSON Labels may not match other
registered labels in a case-insensitive manner unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm CBOR Label:</dt>
<dd>The integer label requested (e.g. <tt>1</tt>). CBOR Labels may not match
other registered labels unless the Designated Experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm Description:</dt>
<dd>Optional additional information clarifying the algorithm. This may
be used for example to document additional chosen parameters.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm Usage Location(s):</dt>
<dd>The algorithm usage locations, which should be one or more of the
values <tt>Issued</tt> or <tt>Presented</tt>.  Other values may be used with the
approval of a Designated Expert.</dd>
<dt>JWP Implementation Requirements:</dt>
<dd>The algorithm implementation requirements for JWP, which must be
one the words <tt>Required</tt>, <tt>Recommended</tt>, <tt>Optional</tt>, <tt>Deprecated</tt>,
or <tt>Prohibited</tt>.
Optionally, the word can be followed by a <tt>+</tt> or <tt>-</tt>. The use of
<tt>+</tt> indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
increased in a future version of the specification.  The use of
<tt>-</tt> indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
decreased in a future version of the specification.
Any identifiers registered for algorithms that are otherwise
unsuitable for direct use as JWP algorithms must be registered as
<tt>Prohibited</tt>.</dd>
<dt>Change Controller:</dt>
<dd>For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IETF". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included.</dd>
<dt>Specification Document(s):</dt>
<dd>Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s):</dt>
<dd>References to a publication or publications in well-known
cryptographic conferences, by national standards bodies, or by
other authoritative sources analyzing the cryptographic soundness
of the algorithm to be registered. The Designated Experts may
require convincing evidence of the cryptographic soundness of a
new algorithm to be provided with the registration request unless
the algorithm is being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.
Having gone through working group and IETF review, the initial
registrations made by this document are exempt from the need to
provide this information.</dd>
</dl>
</section>

<section anchor="AlgsContents"><name>Initial Registry Contents</name>

<section anchor="single-use-jwp-using-es256-algorithm"><name>Single-Use JWP using ES256 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES256</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>SU-ES256</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 1</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Recommended</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="SU-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="single-use-jwp-using-es384-algorithm"><name>Single-Use JWP using ES384 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES384</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>SU-ES384</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 2</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="SU-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="single-use-jwp-using-es512-algorithm"><name>Single-Use JWP using ES512 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES512</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>SU-ES512</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 3</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="SU-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="bbs-using-sha-256-algorithm"><name>BBS using SHA-256 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: BBS using SHA-256</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>BBS</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 4</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: Corresponds to a ciphersuite identifier of <tt>BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2G_HM2S_</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Required</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="BBS-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h256-algorithm"><name>MAC-H256 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H256</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H256</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 5</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H256</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-256</tt> as the MAC,
and <tt>ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h384-algorithm"><name>MAC-H384 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H384</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H384</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 6</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H384</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-384</tt> as the MAC,
and <tt>ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h512-algorithm"><name>MAC-H512 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H512</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H512</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 7</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H512</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-512</tt> as the MAC,
and <tt>ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-k25519-algorithm"><name>MAC-K25519 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-K25519</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-K25519</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 8</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-K25519</tt> uses <tt>KMAC SHAKE128</tt> as the
MAC, and <tt>EdDSA using Curve25519</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-k448-algorithm"><name>MAC-K448 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-K448</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-K448</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 9</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-K448</tt> uses <tt>KMAC SHAKE256</tt> as the MAC,
and <tt>EdDSA using Curve448</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h256k-algorithm"><name>MAC-H256K Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H256K</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H256K</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 10</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H256K</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-256</tt> as the MAC,
and <tt>ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256</tt> for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>
</section>
</section>

</middle>

<back>
<references><name>References</name>
<references><name>Normative References</name>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof">
  <front>
    <title>JSON Web Proof</title>
    <author fullname="David Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite">
      <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
      <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Jeremie Miller" initials="J." surname="Miller">
      <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
    </author>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof-latest"/>
</reference>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7515.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
</references>
<references><name>Informative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.draft-maldant-spice-oidc-cwt-02.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5226.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7518.xml"/>
<reference anchor="VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0">
  <front>
    <title>Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0</title>
    <author fullname="Manu Sporny">
      <organization>Digital Bazaar</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ted Thibodeau Jr">
      <organization>OpenLink Software</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ivan Herman">
      <organization>W3C</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Michael B. Jones">
      <organization>Invited Expert</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Gabe Cohen">
      <organization>Block</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2023" month="December" day="27"/>
  </front>
</reference>
</references>
</references>

<section anchor="example-jwps"><name>Example JWPs</name>
<t>The following examples use algorithms defined in JSON Proof Algorithms and also contain the keys used, so that implementations can validate these samples.</t>

<section anchor="example-json-serialized-single-use-jwp"><name>Example JSON-Serialized Single-Use JWP</name>
<t>This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token.  It demonstrates how to apply selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures.  Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature embedded in the proof.</t>
<t>To begin, we need two asymmetric keys for Single Use: one that represents the JPT Issuer's stable key and the other is an ephemeral key generated by the Issuer just for this JWP.</t>
<t>This is the Issuer's stable private key used in this example in the JWK format:</t>
<figure><name>Issuer Private Key (ES256 in JWK)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "P98A5H6nXHfjyRNIG3WTZX5tShfK-eJG24HOCvj1qEM",
  "y": "ZdgxfASS-hTXEnAIvYnI0aSz2WenHQOgP3J43Gjzl_c",
  "d": "zbqFoMVyw_A7uQFvsJORLPxXCI4GiwZBvXxxsOCIR0o"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK format:</t>
<figure><name>Issuer Ephemeral Private Key (ES256 in JWK)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "Xb5mt8IT26iNL7feuxx0zq_FCNyeSPlMwv8y4qyvrIU",
  "y": "Hdj6TpAT8b8L0IXDANAZXcKlyu6e4FgQPpUU5ziGrAg",
  "d": "F8AAvN-AHaX1GDnPiSpvJFSz67laSUL7NSGMUj16Hh4"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>This is the Holder's presentation private key used in this example in the JWK format:</t>
<figure><name>Holder Presentation Private Key (ES256 in JWK)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "Mvndw9DGgODdNLiEQ-rqpTI2wZ5LKeQfbVRKSmlgv1g",
  "y": "VohB6ZcAiCo0P2F09JAqI1XdciZaglYDo0lAwuqygCQ",
  "d": "mnIjF4G3hihDqSWvwwND1RB_TJj_0FpsaXFV1EJOMVs"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The JWP Protected Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest.  It also includes the ephemeral public key, the Holder's presentation public key and list of claims used for this JPT.</t>
<figure><name>Issuer Protected header (SU-ES256, JSON)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "alg": "SU-ES256",
  "typ": "JPT",
  "iss": "https://issuer.example",
  "claims": [
    "iat",
    "exp",
    "family_name",
    "given_name",
    "email",
    "address",
    "age_over_21"
  ],
  "proof_key": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "x": "Xb5mt8IT26iNL7feuxx0zq_FCNyeSPlMwv8y4qyvrIU",
    "y": "Hdj6TpAT8b8L0IXDANAZXcKlyu6e4FgQPpUU5ziGrAg"
  },
  "presentation_key": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "x": "Mvndw9DGgODdNLiEQ-rqpTI2wZ5LKeQfbVRKSmlgv1g",
    "y": "VohB6ZcAiCo0P2F09JAqI1XdciZaglYDo0lAwuqygCQ"
  }
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<figure><name>Encoded Issuer Protected Header (SU-ES256, JSON, encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL
mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl
9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb2Zfa2V5Ijp
7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiWGI1bXQ4SVQyNmlOTDdmZXV4eDB6
cV9GQ055ZVNQbE13djh5NHF5dnJJVSIsInkiOiJIZGo2VHBBVDhiOEwwSVhEQU5BWlhjS
2x5dTZlNEZnUVBwVVU1emlHckFnIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsia3R5IjoiRU
MiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJNdm5kdzlER2dPRGROTGlFUS1ycXBUSTJ3WjVMS2V
RZmJWUktTbWxndjFnIiwieSI6IlZvaEI2WmNBaUNvMFAyRjA5SkFxSTFYZGNpWmFnbFlE
bzBsQXd1cXlnQ1EifX0
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures.  Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single Protected Header with the associated <tt>alg</tt> value. In this example, the fixed header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object <tt>{"alg":"ES256"}</tt>. This protected header will be used to generate a signature over each corresponding payload in the JWP. The corresponding octet value in the proof is the octet string (base64url-decoded) value of the signature.</t>
<t>The final proof value from the Issuer is an array with the octets of the header signature, followed by entries for each payload signature.</t>
<figure><name>Issuer payloads (JSON, as array)
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[[
    1714521600,
    1717199999,
    "Doe",
    "Jay",
    "jaydoe@example.org",
    {
        "formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
        "street_address": "1234 Main St.",
        "locality": "Anytown",
        "region": "CA",
        "postal_code": 12345,
        "country": "USA"        
    },
    true
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The compact serialization of the same JPT is:</t>
<figure><name>Issued JWP (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL
mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl
9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb2Zfa2V5Ijp
7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiWGI1bXQ4SVQyNmlOTDdmZXV4eDB6
cV9GQ055ZVNQbE13djh5NHF5dnJJVSIsInkiOiJIZGo2VHBBVDhiOEwwSVhEQU5BWlhjS
2x5dTZlNEZnUVBwVVU1emlHckFnIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsia3R5IjoiRU
MiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJNdm5kdzlER2dPRGROTGlFUS1ycXBUSTJ3WjVMS2V
RZmJWUktTbWxndjFnIiwieSI6IlZvaEI2WmNBaUNvMFAyRjA5SkFxSTFYZGNpWmFnbFlE
bzBsQXd1cXlnQ1EifX0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imp
heWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0
b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuI
iwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MT
IzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.T69zblpucqbjz6wg5QTeTvI1crogVDm2m
3gkH_v1rr5KNPUv8wQamtaDstU0S-wSwpMEUcBKxOKgrWY6UqX9aQ~SuTUxAZ9Dd-gpA9
uxPYDfDrxqB9CFXH2wxd9ODf6ucqNsmks0Du3tAdLLgaPL7Dzxo1WxL6c1xhZb2fXNJPM
EA~67gfDB50veY1JzAQSJoH2bo7WJ4UtoTb7Al3YayCIzFEV1m4Ls0nOfUrwKTli-a3mI
B-xHvcJb33t-peqeGdqw~aYwyEzLSwOIn9b2b61sFXeFJKnSOw-cC7YYaBuw_nQ367PVe
B8HclZ2NJXSpVnLt7JGC88hyecgYPjvvK_ZZ1A~NdinVn7N_zhbicKxWMxslNaji89N0R
xU5zCzkQZyxweD8Em-Vw5__rrWkrjO2Wmopcihl_QIPdRKB2z4SFocEA~Q8lv3wGchn_m
FFUjs8hhZ8YJ0qdpZXnTEbnv_DMpZD5HBM6B_IRTJ10FD4ta8I7mPb9lU95-dvlv6obtl
hnj4Q~ZyCVmIVneNelUjb0-dTZGIfouH7WI_AUzMi-VsK1yLEypdV8E4xts5T4JVkEK_x
bRTA50sjKSvAH_9qCV3G6Xw~nrLmBw0Gr57iRt8lmJt9BD0j_UVhmInw5Zv6FP09eV4Rz
NOF-0jUzBl49k4wzwvUgPYowWttqbjA8pJjY7kouA
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>To present this JPT, we first use the following presentation header with a nonce (provided by the Verifier):</t>
<figure><name>Presentation Header (SU-ES256, JSON)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "alg": "SU-ES256",
  "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
  "nonce": "H4iTRVLIsA5zKGwYTbIDfIDrj51KjCG1-XveKhdMQRA"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<figure><name>Presentation Header (SU-ES256, JSON, Base64url-Encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY
29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJINGlUUlZMSXNBNXpLR3dZVGJJRGZJRHJqNTFLakNHMS1YdmVLaG
RNUVJBIn0
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>When signed with the holder's presentation key, the resulting signature are:</t>

<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[2vLbPzg9cRCRGklvfNaOp6yXRw2A4iMbO-CY5MDkg2F8Be2U_nw-OVSt38smp90BuvSY3
gTHVzjqHmLbhLTSUg
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Holder Proof-of-Possession (SU-ES256, JSON)</t>
</blockquote><t>Then by applying selective disclosure of only the given name and age
claims (family name and email hidden), we get the following presented
JPT in compact serialization:</t>

<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY
29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJINGlUUlZMSXNBNXpLR3dZVGJJRGZJRHJqNTFLakNHMS1YdmVLaG
RNUVJBIn0.eyJhbGciOiJTVS1FUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8
vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi
LCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJvb
2Zfa2V5Ijp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoiWGI1bXQ4SVQyNmlOTD
dmZXV4eDB6cV9GQ055ZVNQbE13djh5NHF5dnJJVSIsInkiOiJIZGo2VHBBVDhiOEwwSVh
EQU5BWlhjS2x5dTZlNEZnUVBwVVU1emlHckFnIn0sInByZXNlbnRhdGlvbl9rZXkiOnsi
a3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsIngiOiJNdm5kdzlER2dPRGROTGlFUS1ycXBUS
TJ3WjVMS2VRZmJWUktTbWxndjFnIiwieSI6IlZvaEI2WmNBaUNvMFAyRjA5SkFxSTFYZG
NpWmFnbFlEbzBsQXd1cXlnQ1EifX0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~I
kpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3
QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1
haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxf
Y29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ~~.T69zblpucqbjz6wg5QTeT
vI1crogVDm2m3gkH_v1rr5KNPUv8wQamtaDstU0S-wSwpMEUcBKxOKgrWY6UqX9aQ~2vL
bPzg9cRCRGklvfNaOp6yXRw2A4iMbO-CY5MDkg2F8Be2U_nw-OVSt38smp90BuvSY3gTH
VzjqHmLbhLTSUg~SuTUxAZ9Dd-gpA9uxPYDfDrxqB9CFXH2wxd9ODf6ucqNsmks0Du3tA
dLLgaPL7Dzxo1WxL6c1xhZb2fXNJPMEA~67gfDB50veY1JzAQSJoH2bo7WJ4UtoTb7Al3
YayCIzFEV1m4Ls0nOfUrwKTli-a3mIB-xHvcJb33t-peqeGdqw~aYwyEzLSwOIn9b2b61
sFXeFJKnSOw-cC7YYaBuw_nQ367PVeB8HclZ2NJXSpVnLt7JGC88hyecgYPjvvK_ZZ1A~
NdinVn7N_zhbicKxWMxslNaji89N0RxU5zCzkQZyxweD8Em-Vw5__rrWkrjO2Wmopcihl
_QIPdRKB2z4SFocEA~Q8lv3wGchn_mFFUjs8hhZ8YJ0qdpZXnTEbnv_DMpZD5HBM6B_IR
TJ10FD4ta8I7mPb9lU95-dvlv6obtlhnj4Q
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
</blockquote></section>

<section anchor="example-cbor-serialized-single-use-cpt"><name>Example CBOR-Serialized Single-Use CPT</name>
<t>This example is meant to mirror the prior compact serialization, using
<eref target="CWT">RFC8392</eref> and claims from <xref target="I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt"/>,
illustrated using <xref target="I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals"/> (EDN).</t>
<t>To simplify this example, the same information is represented as the JPT
example above, including the same public and private keys.</t>

<sourcecode type="edn"><![CDATA[
{          / protected header /
  1: 1,     / alg: "SU-ES256" /
  3: 20,    / typ: "JPT" (20CPA) /
  5: "https://issuer.example",  / iss: "https://issuer.example" /
  6: [      / claims /
    6,      / "iat" /
    4,      / "exp" / 
    170,    / "family_name" (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD1) /
    171,    / "given_name"  (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD2) / 
    179,    / "email"       (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD10) /
    187,    / "address"     (I-D.maldant-spice-oidc-cwt TBD18) /
    "age_over_21"
  ],
  8: {      / proof key /
    1: 2,   / kty : "EC2" /
    -1: 1,  / crv: "P-256" /
    -2: h'32f9ddc3d0c680e0dd34b88443eaeaa53236c19e4b29e41f6d544a4a' +
        h'6960bf58', / x / 
    -3: h'568841e99700882a343f6174f4902a2355dd72265a825603a34940c2' +
        h'eab28024'  / y / 
  },
  9: {      / presentation key /
    1: 2,   / kty: "EC2" /
    -1: 1,  / crv: "P-256" /
    -2: h'5dbe66b7c213dba88d2fb7debb1c74ceafc508dc9e48f94cc2ff32e2' +
        h'acafac85', / x / 
    -3: h'1dd8fa4e9013f1bf0bd085c300d0195dc2a5caee9ee058103e9514e7' +
        h'3886ac08'  / y / 
  }
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Issuer Protected Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote>
<sourcecode type="edn"><![CDATA[[ / payloads    /
  / iat         / 171452160,
  / exp         / 171719999,
  / family_name / "Doe",
  / given_name  / "Jay",
  / email       / "jaydoe@example.org",
  / address     / {
    / formatted / 1: "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
    / street    / 2: "1234 Main St.",
    / locality  / 3: "Anytown",
    / region    / 4: "CA",
    / post code / 5: "90210",
    / country   / 6: "USA"
  },
  / age_over_21 / true
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Issuer Payloads (as CBOR array)</t>
</blockquote><t>When signed and serialized, the CPT is represented by the following
CBOR (in hex):</t>

<sourcecode type="hex"><![CDATA[8358cda601010314057668747470733a2f2f6973737565722e6578616d706c65
0687060418aa18ab18b318bb6b6167655f6f7665725f323108a4010220012158
2032f9ddc3d0c680e0dd34b88443eaeaa53236c19e4b29e41f6d544a4a6960bf
58225820568841e99700882a343f6174f4902a2355dd72265a825603a34940c2
eab2802409a4010220012158205dbe66b7c213dba88d2fb7debb1c74ceafc508
dc9e48f94cc2ff32e2acafac852258201dd8fa4e9013f1bf0bd085c300d0195d
c2a5caee9ee058103e9514e73886ac08871a0a3827001a0a3c3d3f63446f6563
4a6179726a6179646f65406578616d706c652e6f7267a601782331323334204d
61696e2053742e0a416e79746f776e2c2043412031323334350a555341026d31
323334204d61696e2053742e0367416e79746f776e0462434105653930323130
0663555341f5885840dfcca036447142876c5894a96ecb67db496e617d4e1b8b
c442d7d5107207562b5f39257703de217f9cac843273f19892e07f83c8f1d21b
f60fe4fc0ac029d406584004bd7aa9d8ff8a4ff57acf366f4aed8d5d220a9273
b2de9e866a49860b447d0a29fdd4d1341248987c69109c40507af98126e70685
2e1677639ce0ebcbbc62125840bba2ba271dac547609417b3cc6403d4df446e6
84dee27b39312a5ca9c4cde8ad52f4755c01295a3e614c0b461120f637f1c788
ffd467f590363a8a6c18ed4de258407d1ddfcd6e30111732258ee67a3ff7f1cd
14c0c940593f3486b6d884fbfa9a064714f0a6d71aa04b1edc3efe476fa2c664
fa0cd52ed060693b0a7ca456b820c25840e5feca083f5aba8f7311dd8ff5260b
e41532fec972b8fbd08a55674a8552b2422a1841d11436afa5add37198661a79
cb06376d2d64676901e1ff268fcc5668d45840a288d49c633e5a0c0f3e575d83
a4d40c9f693ebe4551954e3d031f70ace40ea0c635928e5dbe20f227ebbf1ddb
4db0397ea591a40067e1ae09fbb70a3717f2f45840425204215811b98ec30ff2
57bb2ad97ed4b4d5cf8cdb0362f7c573e19bf1af007b09d030407532b5bd87f2
61a72c372a04c8a75182be293994f5e8d52c41a2895840cf4303b9b41fa2a24a
a2bcc491731ff76da149a071d6bee046226478b99aa117b7ae66993b65890a45
762ba05f8256ba5ccba67d782fd2dc843ec97c4043a022
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Fixtures: Issued Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote><t>The presented form, similarly to the issued form above, is made with
the holder conveying the same parameters and the same set of selectively
disclosed payloads as the JPT above:</t>

<sourcecode type="edn"><![CDATA[{          / protected header /
  1: 1,    / alg: "SU-ES256" /
  6: "https://recipient.example.com", / aud /
  7: h'1f88934552c8b00e73286c184db2037c80eb8f9d4a8c21b5f97bde2a174c4110', / nonce /
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Holder Protected Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote><t>When the appropriate proof is generated, the CPT is serialized into the
following CBOR (in hex):</t>

<sourcecode type="hex"><![CDATA[845846a3010106781d68747470733a2f2f726563697069656e742e6578616d70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]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Presented Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote></section>

<section anchor="example-bbs-jwp"><name>Example BBS JWP</name>
<t>The following example uses the <tt>BBS</tt> algorithm.</t>
<t>This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:</t>
<figure><name>BBS private key in JWK format
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "kty": "EC2",
  "alg": "BBS",
  "use": "proof",
  "crv": "BLS12381G2",
  "x": "Fa_0zEJCeiUtDMYqi_Ze1VIgKDMJBxdmpC9Ky0li-4OU0VKHf97thxy2W_PIP
       s3IFoa79wBsXv54zB7k90dyvaVBeYpPrAO-9Nm69gyE5TWYHJ_9t4EuwlsuTYA
       Phu65",
  "y": "AvHLNGjxokwT9T4chrlhh3oRUtMiZnh97cVrSOQEkqifsQ574IIyTc9yx1LdB
       R3zDFBhteGDMrS45Hf5sOnswRmTxGX13zqRJ7GpgUFTBPzoJ4ykSuAXFX90khZ
       8im7a",
  "d": "ROddaOzvYtwfdcg37a4GLNhFW146nDL-RKAb2MNOKeM"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>There is no additional holder key necessary for presentation proofs.</t>
<t>For the following protected header and array of payloads:</t>
<figure><name>Example issuer protected header
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[{
  "kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8",
  "alg": "BBS"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>These components are signed using the private issuer key previously given, which is then representable in the following serialization:</t>
<figure><name>Issued JWP (BBS, JSON, Compact Serialization)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJUOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4I
iwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~Imph
eWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b
3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIi
wibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiwicmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTI
zNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~dHJ1ZQ.gdD9CAcF2zkH4IntAk-MD2ITKp_uWrawLP
KMiUwE2mH_PF1gFbQlpw7xBq35VJyVSBgAkHeiFoE85Fd7G9Lo9ZLemgqatC5DQLGWdWt
ZW-8
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>For a presentation with the following presentation header:</t>
<figure><name>Holder Presentation Header
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[{
    "alg": "BBS",
    "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
    "nonce": "wrmBRkKtXjQ"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The holder decides to share all information other than the email address, and generates a proof. That proof is represented in the following serialization:</t>
<figure><name>Presentation JWP (BBS, JSON, Compact serialization)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJCQlMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3JlY2lwaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsI
m5vbmNlIjoid3JtQlJrS3RYalEifQ.eyJraWQiOiJIamZjcHlqdVpRLU84WWUyaFFuTmJ
UOVJiYm5yb2JwdGRuRXhSMERValU4IiwiYWxnIjoiQkJTIn0.MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxN
zE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.sCMvF86QBn3R7vS8xNilHYMbf3gk6A0P3sptLdXX
kLIpyWRLI8lL6SD1ysF_-DJNqumzx_WgCetOzY-jaXu02g_Ec_mEOx-bJ-2auYL8SeDFy
jfooFRQGc7G0PEFLBagoygiGL_Rhhe_hMzMduo97ufMVF-0OEcV5F7bi48bczWRFFka0N
UOkZW9e614ZtPzJBA09i_r-34ffr95dU_vJBEUaGPofnZM2B4cW1sw8vtb2BkoKoWIXjq
EYHUW81yA3b5qMy55DW1FUNpOP_uHkWU9VsJQSM7XprMULjKuOaZdbLgv24ffYr7fcTQs
8ySON6GCBfHp0srUc_EIg5Ba_lNi4qg0k3M8UFAnTD_HfBBsvGczg01nKnngb4EO3g8PO
o9jRzojfrDTtq1wvuTMdinx-thiqx9PEuvcSdgOWqu2vQd0tnYEqIvpJj30_90TQ05nFk
_W6dETqaT-Wqt7tkHDzKpp1ghyl6ac-fmcde4
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
</section>

<section anchor="example-mac-jwp"><name>Example MAC JWP</name>
<t>The following example uses the <tt>MAC-H256</tt> algorithm.</t>
<t>This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:</t>
<figure><name>Issuer private key
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "P98A5H6nXHfjyRNIG3WTZX5tShfK-eJG24HOCvj1qEM",
  "y": "ZdgxfASS-hTXEnAIvYnI0aSz2WenHQOgP3J43Gjzl_c",
  "d": "zbqFoMVyw_A7uQFvsJORLPxXCI4GiwZBvXxxsOCIR0o"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>This is the Issuer's ephemerally generated shared secret:</t>
<figure><name>Shared Secret
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA["pFdS_Ph8GDXTdME2ES1PAs1yvwiY7JPoFClnBZcLHdk"
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>This is the Holder's presentation private key in the JWK format:</t>
<figure><name>Holder private key
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "Mvndw9DGgODdNLiEQ-rqpTI2wZ5LKeQfbVRKSmlgv1g",
  "y": "VohB6ZcAiCo0P2F09JAqI1XdciZaglYDo0lAwuqygCQ",
  "d": "mnIjF4G3hihDqSWvwwND1RB_TJj_0FpsaXFV1EJOMVs"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>For the following protected header and array of payloads:</t>
<figure><name>Example issuer protected header
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[{
  "alg": "MAC-H256",
  "typ": "JPT",
  "iss": "https://issuer.example",
  "claims": [
    "iat",
    "exp",
    "family_name",
    "given_name",
    "email",
    "address",
    "age_over_21"
  ],
  "presentation_key": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "use": "sign",
    "x": "Mvndw9DGgODdNLiEQ-rqpTI2wZ5LKeQfbVRKSmlgv1g",
    "y": "VohB6ZcAiCo0P2F09JAqI1XdciZaglYDo0lAwuqygCQ"
  }
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<figure><name>Example issuer payloads (as members of a JSON array)
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[[
    1714521600,
    1717199999,
    "Doe",
    "Jay",
    "jaydoe@example.org",
    {
        "formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
        "street_address": "1234 Main St.",
        "locality": "Anytown",
        "region": "CA",
        "postal_code": 12345,
        "country": "USA"        
    },
    true
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The first MAC is generated using the key <tt>issuer_header</tt> and a value of the issuer protected header as a UTF-8 encoded octet string. This results in the following MAC:</t>
<figure><name>Issuer MAC of protected header (Base64url-Encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="txt"><![CDATA[BT-Yxz59zgCbxVuHiZdk24YU2ANLw2rmpBusoIIQHEY
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The issuer generates an array of derived keys with one for each payload by using the shared secret as the key, and the index of the payload (as <tt>payload_{n}</tt> in UTF-8 encoded octets) as the input in a HMAC operation. This results in the following set of derived keys:</t>
<figure><name>Derived payload keys (Base64url-Encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[[
  "2FyQltudQOc2o_vYTHTc_O_mEgZhOvsLEtFLIy1cB5o",
  "SmC-MI5-dHT3HJMxwm2kfeqBkmPWSHm19KPvSeJEXP8",
  "XiFumFViyN7Glz1r5NBbdR5tU2KoHb971kRAlhca8dM",
  "wURB2gqGrOJCtQEGU9EJxNYAzPnSJtLVeP924AbyWKs",
  "DmyAxJ_qJL1r_VHpuatbRoLq5IlhaaTT-dptqtNT3VA",
  "-Ct88RZPInvTzNzKW68sEKHlI-Uxi1mV4ueYp06f-Ck",
  "wNXSLdoKliDeG2vYMAzkjmYkd7N6Up-3qXzzJNlk468"
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>A MAC is generated for each payload using the corresponding derived payload key. This results in the following set of MAC values:</t>
<figure><name>Payload MAC values (Base64url-Encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[[
  "xxoc18XStdVzVCj9X8cs4LxqZfFl2fUjsay-qXaULo4",
  "cgJ80HoKmfVXi-fdnuCjEQsKd0Dn_Xys6N9eh_Glmqc",
  "wPQZ4S8vAl4gS_qBcqIQhOgHu_jwdBCQAwZpSD0fnSQ",
  "PwlfmCadLPQHiiJQ2D-8wOiq2s_UA_MP7uJv7PCfuWs",
  "Km7eIfZn20KsuQUaTi59X9ADmuZE8xYryUCNfWywJ_0",
  "QVvB9677SzqJvyfTMSq6xqOPBeIiJcFfV91sUHD0JOM",
  "tCY7vTWqAEsJRiql3njVtn8uQ5rjKS22Fl9ThJq1YCw"
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The issuer protected header MAC and the payload MAC octet strings are concatenated into a single value known as the combined MAC representation. This representation is signed with the issuer's private key.</t>
<t>The proof consists of two octet string values: the signature over the combined MAC representation, and the shared secret.</t>
<figure><name>Issued Proof (Base64url-Encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[[
  "vuHT1WWtaBpVZjjTxypjHqAILzhKAVqazEtb_qdCZLLuM7PAsQNynlTqyMfSTJrtHm
AFYvbZBEW8b4kDieNf9g",
  "vCy1i6TT73iG8wzgAvRgIU54BFOTbx7zL_seiSw71MU"
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The final issued JWP in compact serialization is:</t>
<figure><name>Issued JWP (MAC-H256, JSON, Compact Serialization)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaXNzdWVyL
mV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUiLCJnaXZlbl
9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJlc2VudGF0aW9
uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2lnbiIsIngiOiJN
dm5kdzlER2dPRGROTGlFUS1ycXBUSTJ3WjVMS2VRZmJWUktTbWxndjFnIiwieSI6IlZva
EI2WmNBaUNvMFAyRjA5SkFxSTFYZGNpWmFnbFlEbzBsQXd1cXlnQ1EifX0.MTcxNDUyMT
YwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~ImpheWRvZUBleGFtcGxlLm9yZyI~eyJmb
3JtYXR0ZWQiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuXG5Bbnl0b3duLCBDQSAxMjM0NVxuVVNBIiwic3
RyZWV0X2FkZHJlc3MiOiIxMjM0IE1haW4gU3QuIiwibG9jYWxpdHkiOiJBbnl0b3duIiw
icmVnaW9uIjoiQ0EiLCJwb3N0YWxfY29kZSI6MTIzNDUsImNvdW50cnkiOiJVU0EifQ~d
HJ1ZQ.vuHT1WWtaBpVZjjTxypjHqAILzhKAVqazEtb_qdCZLLuM7PAsQNynlTqyMfSTJr
tHmAFYvbZBEW8b4kDieNf9g~vCy1i6TT73iG8wzgAvRgIU54BFOTbx7zL_seiSw71MU
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>Next, we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.</t>
<t>For presentation with the following presentation protected header:</t>
<figure><name>Presentation Protected Header
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[{
  "alg": "MAC-H256",
  "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
  "nonce": "H4iTRVLIsA5zKGwYTbIDfIDrj51KjCG1-XveKhdMQRA"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The holder will take the issuer proof (including shared secret) and derive the same individual payload MAC values (above).</t>
<t>In this case, the holder has decided not to disclose the last three claims provided by the issuer (corresponding to <tt>email</tt>, <tt>address</tt>, and <tt>age_over_21</tt>)</t>
<t>For the disclosed payloads, the holder will provide the corresponding derived key. For the non-disclosed payloads, the holder will provide the corresponding MAC value.</t>
<t>The final presented proof value is an array of octet strings. The contents are presentation header signature, followed by the issuer signature, then the value disclosed by the holder for each payload. This results in the following proof:</t>
<figure><name>Presentation proof (Base64url-Encoded)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[[
  "hXfGuDiaNpy472hZk2Kdoc4ZedICNqIq-8p2ZR6bZA8nLuSJ4hG7VvyKBA_YEw3EI0
Foirx6EuB8sSf9UmJ91Q",
  "vuHT1WWtaBpVZjjTxypjHqAILzhKAVqazEtb_qdCZLLuM7PAsQNynlTqyMfSTJrtHm
AFYvbZBEW8b4kDieNf9g",
  "2FyQltudQOc2o_vYTHTc_O_mEgZhOvsLEtFLIy1cB5o",
  "SmC-MI5-dHT3HJMxwm2kfeqBkmPWSHm19KPvSeJEXP8",
  "XiFumFViyN7Glz1r5NBbdR5tU2KoHb971kRAlhca8dM",
  "wURB2gqGrOJCtQEGU9EJxNYAzPnSJtLVeP924AbyWKs",
  "Km7eIfZn20KsuQUaTi59X9ADmuZE8xYryUCNfWywJ_0",
  "QVvB9677SzqJvyfTMSq6xqOPBeIiJcFfV91sUHD0JOM",
  "tCY7vTWqAEsJRiql3njVtn8uQ5rjKS22Fl9ThJq1YCw"
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The final presented JWP in compact serialization is:</t>
<figure><name>Presented JWP (MAC-H256, JSON, Compact Serialization)
</name>
<sourcecode type="wrapped"><![CDATA[eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmVjaXBpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUuY
29tIiwibm9uY2UiOiJINGlUUlZMSXNBNXpLR3dZVGJJRGZJRHJqNTFLakNHMS1YdmVLaG
RNUVJBIn0.eyJhbGciOiJNQUMtSDI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpQVCIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8
vaXNzdWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJjbGFpbXMiOlsiaWF0IiwiZXhwIiwiZmFtaWx5X25hbWUi
LCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIiwiZW1haWwiLCJhZGRyZXNzIiwiYWdlX292ZXJfMjEiXSwicHJlc
2VudGF0aW9uX2tleSI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2IiwidXNlIjoic2lnbi
IsIngiOiJNdm5kdzlER2dPRGROTGlFUS1ycXBUSTJ3WjVMS2VRZmJWUktTbWxndjFnIiw
ieSI6IlZvaEI2WmNBaUNvMFAyRjA5SkFxSTFYZGNpWmFnbFlEbzBsQXd1cXlnQ1EifX0.
MTcxNDUyMTYwMA~MTcxNzE5OTk5OQ~IkRvZSI~IkpheSI~~~.hXfGuDiaNpy472hZk2Kd
oc4ZedICNqIq-8p2ZR6bZA8nLuSJ4hG7VvyKBA_YEw3EI0Foirx6EuB8sSf9UmJ91Q~vu
HT1WWtaBpVZjjTxypjHqAILzhKAVqazEtb_qdCZLLuM7PAsQNynlTqyMfSTJrtHmAFYvb
ZBEW8b4kDieNf9g~2FyQltudQOc2o_vYTHTc_O_mEgZhOvsLEtFLIy1cB5o~SmC-MI5-d
HT3HJMxwm2kfeqBkmPWSHm19KPvSeJEXP8~XiFumFViyN7Glz1r5NBbdR5tU2KoHb971k
RAlhca8dM~wURB2gqGrOJCtQEGU9EJxNYAzPnSJtLVeP924AbyWKs~Km7eIfZn20KsuQU
aTi59X9ADmuZE8xYryUCNfWywJ_0~QVvB9677SzqJvyfTMSq6xqOPBeIiJcFfV91sUHD0
JOM~tCY7vTWqAEsJRiql3njVtn8uQ5rjKS22Fl9ThJq1YCw
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="acknowledgements"><name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>This work was incubated in the DIF <eref target="https://identity.foundation/working-groups/crypto.html">Applied Cryptography Working Group</eref>.</t>
<t>We would like to thank
Alberto Solavagione
for his valuable contributions to this specification.</t>
<t>The BBS examples were generated using the library at <eref target="https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto">https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto</eref> .</t>
</section>

<section anchor="document-history"><name>Document History</name>
<t>[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]</t>
<t>-09</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Remove JSON serialization</li>
<li>Added CBOR (CPT) example to the appendix using SU-ES256</li>
</ul>
<t>-08</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Made some additional references normative.</li>
<li>Corrected SU-ES256 issuer protected header including private keys</li>
</ul>
<t>-07</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Changing primary editor</li>
<li>Update registry template for algorithms to account for integer
CBOR labels</li>
<li>Restylize initial registry entries for readability</li>
<li>Defer BBS key definition to <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations"/></li>
<li>Modify example generation to use <tt>proof_key</tt> and <tt>presentation_key</tt> names</li>
<li>Change <tt>proof_jwk</tt> to <tt>proof_key</tt> and <tt>presentation_jwk</tt> to
<tt>presentation_key</tt> to better represent that the key may be JSON
or CBOR-formatted.</li>
<li>Moved the registry for <tt>proof_key</tt> and <tt>presentation_key</tt> to JWP
where they are defined. Consolidated usage, purpose and
requirements from algorith musage under these definitions.</li>
<li>Combined <tt>BBS-PROOF</tt> into <tt>BBS</tt></li>
</ul>
<t>-06</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Update reference to new repository home</li>
<li>Fixed #77: Removed vestigial use of <tt>presentation_header</tt>.</li>
<li>Correct <tt>pjwk</tt> to <tt>presentation_jwk</tt></li>
</ul>
<t>-05</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Update of appendix describing MAC-H256 to now also be generated by the build system from a common set of code and templates.</li>
<li>Update single use algorithm to use an array of octet values rather than requiring splitting an octet buffer into parts during generation of a presentation and during verification.</li>
<li>Update BBS algorithm description and examples to clarify the proof is an array with a single octet string.</li>
<li>Update MAC algorithm to use an array of octet values for the proof, rather than requiring splitting an octet buffer into parts.</li>
<li>Add new section on the Combined MAC Representation to clarify operations are serving to recreate this octet string value.</li>
<li>Correct reference to the latest BBS draft.</li>
<li>SU and MAC families now use raw JWA rather than JWS and synthesized headers</li>
<li>Change algorithms to not use base64url-encoding internally. Algorithms are meant to operate on octets, while base64url-encoding is used to represent those octets in JSON and compact serializations.</li>
</ul>
<t>-04</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Refactoring figures and examples to be built from a common set across all three documents</li>
<li>Move single-use example appendix from JWP to JPA</li>
<li>Change algorithm from <tt>BBS-DRAFT-5</tt> to <tt>BBS</tt>, and from <tt>BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-5</tt> to <tt>BBS-PROOF</tt></li>
<li>Update BBS ciphersuite ID to <tt>BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_</tt></li>
<li>Update to draft 5 BLS key representations</li>
</ul>
<t>-03</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Improvements resulting from a full proofreading.</li>
<li>Populated IANA Considerations section.</li>
<li>Updated to use BBS draft -05.</li>
<li>Updated examples.</li>
</ul>
<t>-02</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Add new <tt>BBS-DRAFT-3</tt> and <tt>BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-3</tt> algorithms based on draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-03.</li>
<li>Remove prior <tt>BBS-X</tt> algorithm based on a particular implementation of earlier drafts.</li>
</ul>
<t>-01</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Correct cross-references within group</li>
<li>Describe <tt>issuer_header</tt> and <tt>presentation_header</tt></li>
<li>Update BBS references to CFRG drafts</li>
<li>Rework reference to HMAC ( RFC2104 )</li>
<li>Remove ZKSnark placeholder</li>
</ul>
<t>-00</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Created initial working group draft based on draft-jmiller-jose-json-proof-algorithms-01</li>
</ul>
</section>

</back>

</rfc>
