]> Apple Inc.

shan_wang@apple.com

Cloudflare

chrispatton+ietf@gmail.com

Security Privacy Preserving Measurement next generation unicorn sparkling distributed ledger An extension for the Distributed Aggregation Protocol (DAP) is specified that allows the task configuration to be provisioned in-band. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Privacy Preserving Measurement Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction The DAP protocol enables secure aggregation of a set of reports submitted by Clients. This process is centered around a "task" that determines, among other things, the cryptographic scheme to use for the secure computation (a Verifiable Distributed Aggregation Function ), how reports are partitioned into batches, and privacy parameters such as the minimum size of each batch. Before a task can be executed, it is necessary to first provision the Clients, Aggregators, and Collector with the task's configuration. However, The core DAP specification does not define a mechanism for provisioning tasks. this document describes a mechanism designed to fill this gap. Its key feature is that task configuration is performed completely in-band. It relies solely on the upload channel and the metadata carried by reports themselves. This method presumes the existence of a logical "task author" (written as "Author" hereafter) who is capable of pushing configurations to Clients. All parameters required by downstream entities (the Aggregators and Collector) are encoded in an extension field of the Client's report. There is no need for out-of-band task orchestration between Leader and Helpers, therefore making adoption of DAP easier. The extension is designed with the same security and privacy considerations of the core DAP protocol. The Author is not regarded as a trusted third party: It is incumbent on all protocol participants to verify the task configuration disseminated by the Author and opt-out if the parameters are deemed insufficient for privacy. In particular, adopters of this extension should presume the Author is under the adversary's control. In fact, we expect in a real-world deployment that the Author may be implemented by one of the Aggregators or Collector. Finally, the DAP protocol requires configuring the entities with a variety of assets that are not task-specific, but are important for establishing Client-Aggregator, Collector-Aggregator, and Aggregator-Aggregator relationships. These include:

• The Collector's HPKE configuration used by the Aggregators to encrypt aggregate shares.
• Any assets required for authenticating HTTP requests.

This specification does not specify a mechanism for provisioning these assets; as in the core DAP protocol, these are presumed to be configured out-of-band. Note that we consider the VDAF verification key , used by the Aggregators to aggregate reports, to be a task-specific asset. This document specifies how to derive this key for a given task from a pre-shared secret, which in turn is presumed to be configured out-of-band.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the same conventions for error handling as . In addition, this document extends the core specification by adding the following error types:

Type	Description
invalidTask	An Aggregator has opted out of the indicated task as described in

The terms used follow those described in . The following new terms are used:

Task configuration:

The non-secret parameters required to create a task in task provision.

Task author:

The entity that defines a task's configuration.

The "task_prov" Extension A new extension is defined: When the Client includes this extension with its report, the body of the extension is a TaskConfig defined follows: ; /* A list of URLs relative to which an Aggregator's API endpoints can be found. Defined in I-D.draft-ietf-ppm-dap-02. */ Url aggregator_endpoints<1..2^16-1>; /* This determines the query type for batch selection and the properties that all batches for this task must have. Defined in I-D.draft-ietf-ppm-dap-02. */ QueryConfig query_config; /* Time up to which Clients are allowed to upload to this task. Defined in I-D.draft-ietf-ppm-dap-02. */ Time task_expiration; /* Determines the VDAF type and its config parameters. */ VdafConfig vdaf_config; } TaskConfig; ]]> The purpose of TaskConfig is to define all parameters that are necessary for configuring an Aggregator. It includes all the fields to be associated with a task. (See task configuration in .) In addition to the Aggregator endpoints, maximum batch query count, and task expiration, the structure includes an opaque task_info field that is specific to a deployment. For example, this can be a string describing the purpose of this task. The query_config field defines the DAP query configuration used to guide batch selection. It is defined as follows: The vdaf_config defines the configuration of the VDAF in use for this task. It is structured as follows (codepoints are as defined in ): ; /* buckets */ case poplar1_aes128: uint16; /* bit length of input string */ } } VdafConfig; ]]> Apart from the VDAF-specific parameters, this structure includes a mechanism for differential privacy (DP). This field, dp_config, is structured as follows:

• OPEN ISSUE: Should spell out definition of DpConfig for various differential privacy mechanisms and parameters. See issue #94 for discussion.

The definition of Time, Duration, Url, and QueryType follow those in .

Deriving the Task ID When using the task_prov extension, the task ID is computed as follows: where task_config is the TaskConfig structure disseminated by the Author. String task_prov_salt is defined to be the SHA-256 hash of the octet string "dap-taskprov-00". Function HKDF-Extract() denotes the HKDF extraction function defined in instantiated with SHA-256.

Deriving the VDAF Verification Key When a Leader and Helper implement the task_prov extension in the context of a particular DAP deployment, they SHOULD compute the shared VDAF verification key as described in this section. The Aggregators are presumed to have securely exchanged a pre-shared secret out-of-band. The length of this secret MUST be 32 bytes. Let us denote this secret by verify_key_init. Let VERIFY_KEY_SIZE denote the length of the verification key for the VDAF indicated by the task configuration. (See , Section 5.) The VDAF verification key used for the task is computed as follows: where task_prov_salt and task_id are as defined in . Functions HKDF-Extract() and HKDF-Expand() are as defined in . Both functions are instantiated with SHA-256.

Configuring a Task Prior to participating in a task, each protocol participant must determine if the TaskConfig disseminated by the Author can be configured. The participant is said to "opt in" to the task if the derived task ID (see ) corresponds to an already configured task or the task ID is unrecognized and therefore corresponds to a new task. A protocol participant MAY "opt out" of a task if:

1. The derived task ID corresponds to an already configured task, but the task configuration disseminated by the Author does not match the existing configuration.
2. The VDAF, DP, or query configuration is deemed insufficient for privacy.
3. A secure connection to one or both of the Aggregator endpoints could not be established.
4. The task lifetime is too long.

A protocol participant MUST opt out if the task has expired. The behavior of each protocol participant is determined by whether or not they opt in to a task.

Supporting HPKE Configurations Independent of Tasks In DAP, Clients need to know the HPKE configuration of each Aggregator before sending reports. (See HPKE Configuration Request in .) However, in a DAP deployment that supports the task_prov extension, if a Client requests the Aggregator's HPKE configuration with the task ID computed as described in , the task ID may not be configured in the Aggregator yet, because the Aggregator is still waiting for the first Client report with the task_prov extension to arrive. To mitigate this issue, if an Aggregator wants to support the task_prov extension, it SHOULD choose which HPKE configuration to advertise to Clients independent of the task ID. It MAY continue to support per-task HPKE configurations for other tasks that are configured out-of-band. In addition, if a Client wants to include the task_prov extension in its report, it SHOULD NOT specify the task_id parameter when requesting the HPKE configuration from an Aggregator.

Client Behavior Upon receiving a TaskConfig from the Author, the Client decides whether to opt in to the task as described in . If the Client opts out, it MUST not attempt to upload reports for the task.

• OPEN ISSUE: In case of opt-out, would it be useful to specify how to report this to the Author?

Once the client opts in to a task, it MAY begin uploading reports for the task. Each report MUST offer the task_prov extension with the TaskConfig disseminated by the Author as the extension payload. In addition, the report's task ID MUST be computed as described in .

Leader Behavior

Upload Protocol Upon receiving a Report from the Client with the task_prov extension, if the Leader does not support the extension, it MUST ignore the extension payload and proceed as usual. In particular, if the task ID is not recognized, then it MUST abort the upload request with "unrecognizedTask".

• NOTE: This behavior assumes unrecognized extensions are to be ignored. See #334 for discussion.

Otherwise, if the Leader does support the extension, it first attempts to parse the payload. If parsing fails, it MUST abort with "unrecognizedMessage". Next, it checks that the task ID included in the report matches the task ID derived from the extension payload as specified in . If the task ID does not match, then the Leader MUST abort with "unrecognizedTask". The Leader then decides whether to opt in to the task as described in . If it opts out, it MUST abort the upload request with "invalidTask".

• OPEN ISSUE: In case of opt-out, would it be useful to specify how to report this to the Author?

Finally, once the Leader has opted in to the task, it completes the upload request as usual.

Aggregate Protocol When the Leader opts in to a task, it derives the VDAF verification key for that task as described in .

Collect Protocol The Collector might issue a collect request for a task provisioned by the task_prov extension prior to opting in to the task. In this case, the Leader would need to abort the collect request with "unrecognizedTask". When it does so, it SHOULD also include a "Retry-After" header in its HTTP response indicating the time after which the Collector should retry its request.

• TODO: Find RFC reference for "Retry-After".

• OPEN ISSUE: This semantics is awkward, as there's no way for the Leader to distinguish between Collectors who support the extension and those that don't. We should consider adding an extension field to CollectReq.

Helper Behavior Upon receiving of an AggregateInitializeReq from the Leader, If the Helper does not support the task_prov extension, it MUST ignore the extension payload and process each ReportShare as usual. In particular, if the Helper does not recognize the task ID, it MUST abort the aggregate request with error "unrecognizedTask". Otherwise, if the Helper supports the extension, it proceeds as follows. First, the Helper checks that all report shares carried by the request pertain to the same task. In particular, it checks that:

1. Either all report shares have the task_prov extension or none do. If not the Helper MUST abort with "unrecognizedMessage".
2. All report shares with the task_prov extension have the same extension payload. If not, the Helper MUST abort with "unrecognizedMessage".

• OPEN ISSUE: This awkward input validation step could be skipped if AggregateInitializeReq had an extension field that we could stick the task configuration in. This would also save significantly in overhead.

Next, the Helper attempts to parse the extension payload. If parsing fails, it MUST abort with "unrecognizedMessage". Next, the Helper checks that the task ID included in the message matches the task ID derived from the extension payload as defined in . If not, the Helper MUST abort with "unrecognizedTask". Next, the Helper decides whether to opt in to the task as described in . If it opts out, it MUST abort the aggregate request with "invalidTask".

• OPEN ISSUE: In case of opt-out, would it be useful to specify how to report this to the Author?

Finally, the Helper completes the aggregate initialize request as usual, deriving the VDAF verification key for the task as described in .

Collector Behavior Upon receiving a TaskConfig from the Author, the Collector first decides whether to opt in to the task as described in . If the Collector opts out, it MUST not attempt to upload reports for the task. Otherwise, once opted in, the Collector MAY begin to issue collect requests for the task. The task ID for each request MUST be derived from the TaskConfig as described in . If the Leader responds to a collect request with an "unrecognizedTask" error, but the HTTP response includes a "Retry-After" header, the Collector SHOULD retry its collect request after waiting for the duration indicated by the header.

Security Considerations This document has the same security and privacy considerations as the core DAP specification. In particular, for privacy we consider the Author to be under control of the adversary. It is therefore incumbent on protocol participants to verify the privacy parameters of a task before opting in. In addition, the task_prov extension is designed to maintain robustness even when the Author misbehaves, or is merely misconfigured. In particular, if the Clients and Aggregators have an inconsistent view of the the task configuration, then aggregation of reports will fail. This is guaranteed by the binding of report metadata to encrypted input shares provided by HPKE encryption.

• OPEN ISSUE: What if the Collector and Aggregators don't agree on the task configuration? Decryption should fail.

A malicious coalition of Clients might attempt to pollute an Aggregator's long-term storage by uploading reports for many (thousands or perhaps millions) of distinct tasks. While this does not directly impact tasks used by honest Clients, it does present a Denial-of-Service risk for the Aggregators themselves.

• TODO: Suggest mitigations for this. Perhaps the Aggregators need to keep track of how many tasks in total they are opted in to?

The HKDF extraction function is used to derive the task ID. An extractor is not required for security. In fact, a collision-resistant hash function would be sufficient for our application. The choice to use an extractor is conservative in that it allows the derived task ID to be treated as pseudorandom whenever the task configuration itself has high min-entropy from the perspective of the adversary. However, whether this is the case depends on the specific threat model. We note that, in the the threat model for the core DAP protocol, the task configuration is known to the attacker and thus has no entropy.

IANA Considerations

• NOTE(cjpatton) Eventually we'll have IANA considerations (at the very least we'll need to allocate a codepoint) but we can leave this blank for now.

Normative References ISRG Cloudflare Mozilla Cloudflare There are many situations in which it is desirable to take measurements of data which people consider sensitive. In these cases, the entity taking the measurement is usually not interested in people's individual responses but rather in aggregated data. Conventional methods require collecting individual responses and then aggregating them, thus representing a threat to user privacy and rendering many such measurements difficult and impractical. This document describes a multi-party distributed aggregation protocol (DAP) for privacy preserving measurement (PPM) which can be used to collect aggregate data without revealing any individual user's data. Cisco Cloudflare Google This document describes Verifiable Distributed Aggregation Functions (VDAFs), a family of multi-party protocols for computing aggregate statistics over user measurements. These protocols are designed to ensure that, as long as at least one aggregation server executes the protocol honestly, individual measurements are never seen by any server in the clear. At the same time, VDAFs allow the servers to detect if a malicious or misconfigured client submitted an input that would result in an incorrect aggregate result. This document describes a scheme for hybrid public key encryption (HPKE). This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key. HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric KEM, key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function. Some authenticated variants may not be supported by all KEMs. We provide instantiations of the scheme using widely used and efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA2. This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

Contributors

• CP: Unless the order is meaningful, consider alphabetizing these names.

Junye Chen Apple Inc. junyec@apple.com Suman Ganta Apple Inc. sganta2@apple.com Gianni Parsa Apple Inc. gianni_parsa@apple.com Michael Scaria Apple Inc. mscaria@apple.com Kunal Talwar Apple Inc. ktalwar@apple.com Christopher A. Wood Cloudflare caw@heapingbits.net